CFA: Philosophy of Cognitive Science and Psychology at AAP again this year!

As part of this year’s Australasian Association of Philosophy meeting (6th-11th July, Australian National University) The Australasian Society for Cognitive Science will be coordinating a stream Advances in Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences and Psychology.

In recent decades philosophers taking a rigorously naturalistic approach to the mind (broadly treating minds as natural phenomena open to empirical investigation) have made considerable advances in our understanding of phenomena such as consciousness, memory, delusions and mental representation to name just a few. This stream aims to showcase the newest work in this area. It is my pleasure to invite contributions studying any and all aspects of the mind and related phenomena grounded in empirical discoveries.

Abstracts of up to 250 words should be submitted via the conference website: http://www.aap-conferences.org.au/ when submitting be sure to select the option indicating you are submitting for this stream.

abstract submissions are now open: http://www.aap-conferences.org.au/aap2014-submit-abstract/

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions about the stream. General enquiries about the conference not related to this stream should be directed to phil.admin.cass@anu.edu.au

Survey on Impressions of Responsibility in Cases of Filicide

You are invited to take part in a short (10 minute) survey of people’s impressions of the responsibility of perpetrators of filicide. If you would like to participate, or for more information, please follow the below link:

https://macquariehs.qualtrics.com/SE/?SID=SV_7aegLdbDgXtdB3L

Please do not participate if you are under the age of 18 or if you have personal experience with such crimes.

For more information please contact Dr. Glenn Carruthers at glenn.carruthers@mq.edu.au

Sincerely

Glenn Carruthers

CFP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Special Issue of Topoi

apologies for x-postings 

CFP: The Hard Problem of Consciousness, Special Issue of Topoi

 

In addition to the below CFP we are also seeking to expand our pool of reviewers for this issue. If you are available to review a paper please contact the guest editors named below.

 

Much work in the philosophy of consciousness begins with the premise that consciousness offers a uniquely Hard Problem. This premise can lead to radical speculative metaphysics such as pan-protopsychism (Chalmers) or epiphenomenal property dualism (early Jackson). It can also be used by researchers to justify ignoring advances in consciousness studies from other disciplines. However, not everyone agrees that consciousness poses a Hard Problem and instead offer explanations of consciousness in general (Clark, Dennett, Irvine, O’Brien and Opie, Prinz) or particular conscious experiences (G.Carruthers, de Vignemont, Frith and Hohwy). Given that the existence of a Hard Problem is controversial and that it is supposed to lead to radical metaphysical conclusions we would expect that advocates of the existence of a Hard Problem would have considerable arguments in favour of their view. Often, however, the nature of problem is treated as self-evident and not argued for, despite the controversy. In this issue we wish to ask what arguments, if any, can be put forward that consciousness really does pose a uniquely hard problem and how they fare in the face of conceptual and empirical scrutiny.

 

Additionally work in developing theories of consciousness has led to a proliferation of hypotheses regarding the nature of consciousness. These hypotheses are motivated by empirical discoveries in numerous fields such as attention (Prinz), psychophysics (Dennett, Clark) and delusions research or psychiatry more broadly (Frith and Hohwy). As these hypotheses are developed implications for how consciousness is to be characterised emerge.

 

These considerations suggest a variety of questions to be posed regarding the existence of a Hard Problem. Here are some (non-prescriptive examples):

 

Are there good a priori reasons to believe that consciousness offers a uniquely “Hard Problem” and so demands a radically different explanation to other mental phenomena?

 

Is the characterisation of consciousness as ‘Hard’ plausible in light of theoretical advances? If not how is the problem of consciousness to be characterised; i.e. what is the explanatory target of a theory of consciousness?

 

What do various empirical discoveries about consciousness tell us about the nature of the problem we are investigating? Is it plausible that consciousness poses a hard problem in light of discoveries in attention, psychophysics or any other research?

 

For this issue we are interested in papers which address the status of the Hard Problem as a characterisation of consciousness from a rigorous multi-disciplinary perspective. Contributions should be accessible to anyone within the broad (multi-disciplinary) field of consciousness studies. We are open to new empirical and theoretical advances that specially address the status of the Hard problem. The guiding question for the issue is only: is the characterisation of consciousness as posing a uniquely Hard Problem reasonable?

 

Deadline for initial submission of papers February 28 2014

Submissions must be made using Topoi’s online submission system at: http://www.editorialmanager.com/topo/

When submitting your paper, please make sure to select “S.I.: Hard problem of consciousness (Carruthers/Schier)” in the scroll-down menu for Article Type. In preparing your article for submission, follow the guidelines available from the journal website, http://www.springer.com/philosophy/journal/11245 , under Information for Guest Editors and Authors –> Manuscript Preparation. 

If you have any questions please contact the guest editors:

Glenn Carruthers: glenn.rj.carruthers@gmail.com

Elizabeth Schier: lizschier@gmail.com

cfa AAP Stream “Advances in Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences”

Apologies for Cross Posting- please distribute to interested parties

As part of this year’s Australasian Association of Philosophy meeting (7th-12th July, University of Quensland St Lucia campus) I will be coordinating a stream called “Advances in Philosophy of the Cognitive Sciences”.

In recent decades philosophers taking a rigerously naturalistic approach to the mind (broadly treating minds as natural phenomena open to empirical investigation) have made considerable advances in our understanding of phenomena such as consciousness, memory, delusions and mental representation to name just a few. This stream aims to showcase the newest work in this area. It is my pleasure to invite contributions studying any and all aspects of the mind and related phenomena grounded in empirical discoversies.

Abstracts of up to 250 words should be submitted via the conference website: http://www.aap-conferences.org.au/ when submitting be sure to select the option indicating you are submitting for this stream.

 

Please feel free to contact me if you have any questions. General equiries about the conference not related to this stream should be directed to Gilbert Burgh and Damian Cox aap-2013@uq.edu.au

all the best

Glenn